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objective of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is thwarted.Imputation of contributory negligence by the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, which effectively turns it into a defense mechanism,
should be a highly controversial issue. The imputation of contributory negligence too frequently frustrates humanitarian principles and
leaves innocent injured parties without redress. With a greater need
today for a theory that will allow recovery to the unfortunate automobile victim,"' there appears to be little justification for sacrificing
justice on the altar of "formal symmetry" of concepts. Although the
Court in the instant case reiterated the doctrine that the mere relationship of the parties as husband and wife could not be used to impute contributory negligence, it nevertheless represents an undesirable extension of imputation of contributory negligence.
WILLIAM S. LANCASTER

USURY: WHAT CONSTITUTES WILLFUL VIOLATION OF
THE STATUTE?
Stewart v. Nangle, 103 So.2d 649 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958)
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, lent husband's employer, defendant,
a total of $18,750, secured by two notes and a mortgage on land.
In addition to six per cent interest, plaintiffs were to receive an investment bonus calculated on the amount of business done by defendant. From December 1, 1949, date of the initial loan, through
September 30, 1953, when payment was stopped, defendant made
interest and bonus payments of $12,647.80. After due demand for
payment of the notes, plaintiffs brought an action to foreclose the
mortgage. Defendant interposed usury as a defense. The trial court
found the transaction, although entered into in good faith and without thought of its usurious character, to be in violation of the Florida
usury statute. The chancellor held that the good faith of the plain17james, supra note 1, at 341: "This in turn will call for a re-evaluation of the
both-ways test to see whether its formal symmetry may not conceal an equal treatment for policies that are diametrically opposed to each other, so that it tends to
be self-defeating."
isSee GREEN, TRAFFIC VIcTIMs: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958), for an excellent
discussion of the problem and a suggested solution.
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tiffs and the relationship of the parties had no bearing on the issue,
and decreed that the amount paid as interest and as business bonuses
be doubled and forfeited by plaintiffs. On appeal, HELD, the chancellor's statement that the good faith of the lenders, the relationship of
the parties, and the circumstances of the loan had no bearing on the
case indicated a misconception of the force and effect of the word
willfully as used in the statute.1 Reversed and remanded.
In Florida all contracts, other than those of a corporation, for
the payment of interest at a higher rate than ten per cent per annum
are usurious. 2 Prior to 1909 all usurious contracts were penalized by
forfeiture,3 but the usury statute was amended in 1909 to impose
4
forfeiture for willful violations only.
The term willfully is vague; it permits wide latitude in interpreting
the penalty provision of the statute.5 Willful has been defined, perhaps oversimply, as "intentional, not accidental, not involuntary."6
Thus it has been held that usury is largely a matter of intent, which is
determined by whether there was a purpose in the lender's mind to obtain more than the legal interest and whether by the terms of the
transaction he may do so.7 The Florida cases, however, do not distinguish between an intent to charge the rate provided in the transaction
and an intent to violate the statute.
Assertions as to what constitutes the requisite intent are many
and varied. A number of jurisdictions have found intent insignificant.8 In Manchester Realty Co. v. Kanehl9 the Connecticut court
found intent as a matter of law when the lender's charges exceeded
that permitted by statute by only $7.81.
'FLA. STAT. §687.04 (1957). See also Maule v. Eckis, 156 Fla. 790, 24 So.2d 576
(1946); Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321, 179 So. 674 (1937); Chandler v. Kendrick,
108 Fla. 450, 146 So. 551 (1933).
2FL. STAT. §687.02 (1957).
3Fla. Laws 1891, c. 4022; Coe v. Muller, 74 Fla. 399, 77 So. 88 (1917).
4Fla. Laws 1909, c. 5906, now FLA. STAT. §687.04 (1957), Coe v. Muller, supra
note 3.
5As defined by the courts, willful and willfully alone occupy 39 pages in 45
WORDS AND pHRASES (perm. ed. 1940).
(Garrett v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 484, 487, 285 S.W. 203, 204 (1926).
7Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450, 146 So. 551 (1933). The use of a subjective test as determinative of usury increases the draftsman's difficulties in dealing with transactions involving both a loan and a profit-sharing agreement.
sE.g., Houchard v. Berman, 79 Ariz. 381, 290 P.2d 735 (1955); Paillet v. Vroman,
52 Cal. App. 2d 297, 126 P.2d 419 (1942); Independent Foods, Inc. v. Lucas County
Savings Bank, 70 N.E.2d 139 (Ohio App. 1946).
9130 Conn. 552, 36 A.2d 114 (1944).
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In the instant case the court quoted at length from a number of
Florida cases in which no usury was found because of lack of intent.
In Chandler v. Kendrick ° the lender was an unsophisticated woodsman who received an amount in excess of the legal interest. The
borrower, a business man of experience, voluntarily paid the excess
amount in consideration of time extensions and as reimbursement
to the lender for his expenses. The Court seems to have based its
decision on two points: (1) Intent was lacking because "Kendrick ...
had no purpose whatever of charging more than the amount actually
loaned with eight per cent. interest,"11 and the charge was therefore
not willful; and (2) the charge itself was not "interest" and was
therefore not subject to the statute. The Court said that "under the
facts . . . it was in no sense a sum charged for the use of the loan."12
In Jones v. Hammock13 the transaction on the part of the lender
was handled by an attorney, and neither lender nor borrower realized that it was tainted with usury for over seven years, during which
time the lender had extended many accommodations to the borrower.
The initial loan was for three years and the excess interest was
$25.00; however, if the excess were apportioned to the entire term of
seven years over which the loan ran as the result of extensions, the
resulting charge would be far less than the legal rate. Moreover, it
was intimated that the borrower was guilty of gross laches. The
Court, two justices dissenting, held that there was no usury. In Clark
v. Grey14 the initial contract between the parties was usurious, but
by a subsequent agreement it was altered to remove the taint of
usury. In an action by the lender to foreclose the mortgage the borrower asserted usury. The Court held that there was no usury because
of the subsequent purging agreement.
The foregoing cases, which were relied on to support the holding
in the instant case, are readily distinguishable on their facts. The
amounts involved are inconsequential, whereas in the instant case the
amount is substantial. The relationships between the parties involved are not comparable; the lender in the instant case had been
in the borrower's employ for six years- 5 and therefore may be presumed to have had at least some idea of the volume of business done
10108 Fla. 450, 146 So. 551 (1933).
11Id. at 452, 146 So. at 552.
12Id. at 453, 146 So. at 552.
13131 Fla. 321, 179 So. 674 (1937).
14101 Fla. 1058, 132 So. 832 (1931).
15At 651.
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by his employer. It is conceivable that he also had some idea as to
the amounts to which he would be entitled as an investment bonus
under the agreement. The fact that he received such excessive
amounts for a period of over three years tends to substantiate these
observations. It is difficult to perceive that the plaintiffs' conduct was
not willful, at least to the extent that they "willfully" intended to
collect the excess sums provided for in the transaction.
While the transaction in the instant case may or may not have
been usurious, in view of the trial court's holding it must be assumed
that the chancellor found the requisite elements, including at least
one form of intent. Clarification of the type of intent requisite in
usury cases was desirable if, as would seem to be the case, the court
of appeals reversed on error of law rather than on abuse of discretion.
Neither the decision nor the authorities cited answer the question:
To come under the forfeiture statute must a lender (1) have a purpose to take more than the legal interest, (2) have an unlawful or corrupt intent, or (3) have knowledge that the transaction is prohibited
and a purpose to violate the statute?
ROBERT L. SEELEY

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss3/13

4

